Policy boostering the Social Impact Investment Market in the UK by Wiggan, Jay
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Policy boostering the Social Impact Investment Market in the UK
Citation for published version:
Wiggan, J 2018, 'Policy boostering the Social Impact Investment Market in the UK' Journal of Social Policy,
vol. 47, no. 4, pp. 721-738. DOI: 10.1017/S0047279418000089
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1017/S0047279418000089
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
Journal of Social Policy
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 08. Jul. 2019
Policy boostering the Social Impact Investment Market in the UK 
Abstract 
Under the Conservative-Liberal Coalition Government and the Conservative Government that took 
office in 2015, policy measures were introduced to develop a Social Impact Investment Market that 
harnesses private finance to invest in services to achieve social and financial outcomes. This nascent 
market is of growing interest amongst social scientists (Bryan and Rafferty, 2014; Whitfield, 2015; 
McHugh et al, 2013; Dowling, 2017; Edmiston and Nicholls, 2017), but little attention has been given 
to interrogating related UK Government discourse. The originality of this paper is its contribution to 
addressing this ‘discourse gap’; enhancing our understanding of the development and 
representation of impact investment in the UK. Using Hyatt’s (2013a) Critical Policy Discourse 
Analysis Framework, a rigorous critical examination of UK Coalition and Conservative Government 
impact investment discourse between 2011 and 2016 is undertaken. The significance of this work 
lies in its contextualisation and deconstruction of UK Government texts to identify and unpack how 
distinct rationales, justifications and legitimations within draw on and (re)produce a Broken Britain-
Big Society narrative (Wiggan, 2011; Dowling and Harvie, 2014; Smith and Jones, 2015) to ‘policy 
booster’ financialised reconfiguration of the welfare state as the route to a better society. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Social Impact Investment Markets (SIIM) involve private capital (commercial and 
philanthropic) investing in a range of activity; be it a charity or social enterprise seeking to develop 
existing service provision and/or infrastructure, or resourcing new interventions commissioned by 
governments to resolve an ‘intractable’ problem such as youth unemployment or reoffending. The 
key issue is that social impact investment involves generating both a social return, understood in 
terms of improved outcomes for targeted individuals and/or society, and a financial return for 
investors of the original capital plus interest (OECD, 2015: 42; EPRS, 2014: 3).    
The SIIM is a subject of growing academic interest and investigation, with scholars examining 
the commissioning, resourcing, organising, regulation and delivery of impact investments and their 
effectiveness (Bryan and Rafferty, 2014; Whitfield, 2015; McHugh et al, 2013; Dowling and Harvie, 
2014; Smith and Jones, 2015; Edmiston and Nicholls, 2017). To date, limited attention has been 
given to the discourse of SIIM (Fraser et al, 2016), particularly how governments discursively 
construct a rationale for and legitimation of the turn to and development of a SIIM by drawing on 
particular interpretations and representations of social and economic challenges/opportunities. The 
original contribution of this paper is to address this ‘discourse gap’ by conducting a critical 
examination of SIIM discourse under the Conservative and Liberal Coalition Government (hereafter 
the Coalition) and the subsequent Conservative Government between 2011 and 2016. The approach 
taken applies the Critical Policy Discourse Analysis Framework (CPDAF) developed by Hyatt (2013a) 
as a means to draw together various discourse analysis techniques into a toolkit for facilitating use in 
analysis of policy. The CPDAF disaggregates analysis into two distinct but connected components – 
contextualisation and deconstruction – creating a transparent method for examination of the link 
between text and broader socio-economic and political structures, and interrogation of the 
organisation and language of the text.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section one outlines the various components of the CPDAF; 
the rationale for its use and the documents purposively selected for analysis. This includes key 
impact investment documents for the Coalition Government and the Conservative Government 
along with speeches by the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions and the 
Minister for Civil Society. The second section provides a brief account of the evolution of social 
investment under New Labour and subsequent policy reforms under the Coalition and 
Conservatives. This provides a sense of the policy trajectory and the emergence, acceleration and 
embedding of a distinct impact investment market (see Whitfield, 2015). 
The third section applies the ‘contextualisation’ component of the CPDAF to analyse how the 
changes detailed in section two were accompanied by particular forms of discursive reasoning and 
justification (known as Warrants) centred on a ‘Broken Britain–Big Society’ problem-solution 
narrative. By this I mean a distinct problem representation (bureaucratic welfare, fragmented 
communities) and desired goal (a stronger cohesive society) are threaded together to contextualise 
the case for, and ‘hard sell’ of, the Social Impact Investment Market. This vigorous ‘selling’ of a SIIM 
‘imaginary’ (the projection of a distinct desirable reality) (Chiapello and Fairclough, 2002: 195) that 
emerges from the UK Government SIIM discourse is conceptualised as an act of ‘policy boosterism’. 
This captures how policymakers strategically promote policies to manufacture anticipation and 
demand for preferred reforms, while positioning the subject boostered as a source of innovation, 
expertise and/or site for investment (McCann, 2013: 5-8). Policy boostering in this example is then 
understood as a means to construe SIIM as the unrealised future of welfare, helping to create the 
supportive ideational context within which the reforms necessary to construct the SIIM as present 
reality proceed. Section four examines how the text positions finance as a positive force for social 
change and how social investment is (re) contextualised as synonymous with the distinct market 
hybrid concept of SIIM. This entwining of welfare with financial markets is in keeping with advancing 
a conservative liberal market project of utilising the state for the purpose of creating and extending 
the logic of a competitive market order throughout society (Amable, 2012). The fifth section 
concludes.  
  
Analytical framework 
Following Howarth (2009: 311) and Bacchi (2009; 2012: 4) the standpoint adopted here is 
that policy is relatively open to being (re)made in multiple ways by the competing priorities, 
preferences and interpretations of actors. Inequity in resources and relations of 
domination/subordination mean not all begin with the same capacity to communicate and pursue 
realisation of their preferred reality. Powerful actors must though still work to establish their 
interpretation as the dominant understanding of events/ circumstances and embed their preferred 
course of action as the most feasible (Panezzi and Miorelli, 2013: 303). As such, the discourse of a 
government is entwined with the material enactment of policy, be it in the form of new legislation, 
institutions or practices. In turn these may re-configure the expectations, interpretations and social 
relations of actors in ways that (albeit temporally and spatially contingent) help to embed the 
dominance of a preferred discourse (Chiapello and Fairclough, 2002: 195). Consequently, policy and 
political texts contain data through which researchers can examine how policymakers interpret, 
represent and propose to resolve an issue and how this helps constitute new policy directions 
(Bacchi, 2012: 2-4; Baachi and Ronnblom, 2014: 179).  
To operationalise examination of the impact investing discourse of UK Governments 
between 2011 and 2016 I use Hyatt’s (2013a; 2013b) CPDAF (see Wiggan, 2017). The CPDAF draws 
together various critical discourse techniques to provide a toolkit for policy analysts seeking a 
theoretically informed, but pragmatic means to conduct a transparent and systematic multi-pronged 
examination of a policy discourse and its relationship to policy action and orientation (Wiggan, 
2017).  Disaggregating analysis into two distinct, but related components - contextualisation and 
deconstruction of policy (Hyatt, 2013b: 834) a layered analysis is encouraged that is empirically 
grounded in the text, but informed by and linked to the broad policy context. Moving between 
examination of word use and sentence structure; how text appeals to, and represents abstract 
concepts and how these connect to ideational positioning and socio-political context provides a 
means to identify underlying ideational traditions and preferences, how these are constructed 
within the text, for what purpose and how this relates, or not to actual policy development (Hyatt 
and Meraud, 2015: 222). 
Contextualisation involves identifying policy goals, the tools used to pursue these, the 
trajectories of policy and how policymakers articulate these. Drawing explicitly on Cochran-Smith 
and Fries (2001 – cited by Hyatt, 2013: 839) Hyatt also sets out how contextualisation involves 
unpacking how policymakers advance three distinct forms of justification (or Warrant) in their 
discursive construction of the case for a given policy- Political, Accountability and Evidentiary 
Warrants. The Political Warrant situates a given intervention in terms of how it will help protect 
and/or achieve desirable (albeit) abstract social values and concepts (appeals to the nation, fairness 
or common good). The Accountability Warrant is attuned to the policy and social consequences of 
(in) action, where the case for a given policy is constructed in relation to what it will achieve or the 
negative outcomes likely if reform is obstructed. Finally, the Evidentiary Warrant is where 
policymakers situate their policy choice as credible, necessary and desirable by grounding it in an 
ostensibly neutral, objective reading of empirical material (Hyatt, 2013: 839; Wiggan, 2017).  
The deconstruction component the CPDAF involves fine grained analysis of the semantic and 
lexical aspects of interpreting and representing actors, practices, realities and imaginaries in the text. 
It includes teasing out examples of Inter-discursivity and Inter-textuality, which refers to how one 
policy discourse draws on and contributes to other discourses and is represented in and across 
multiple texts. Deconstruction also incorporates exploring the terminology, word use and structuring 
of texts (lexical-grammatical) to identify how issues are included/excluded and represented and the 
strategies used to encourage readers/ audiences to make particular judgments on an issue (Inscribed 
evaluation and Evoked evaluation). Inscribed evaluation refers to how a positive or negative 
assessment is explicitly written into a text. Conversely, Evoked evaluation refers to how a text seeks 
to prime the reader to draw a particular conclusion, or conjure up an image, without making the 
position of the author clear (Hyatt, 2013: 841; Wiggan, 2017: 643). The CPDAF also incorporates the 
idea of four distinct Modes of legitimation drawn from Fairclough’s (2003 – cited in Hyatt, 2013: 840) 
work. These include appeals to legitimacy rooted in the authority of the author (Authorisation); to 
social utility (Rationalisation); to political or societal definitions of desirable values (Moral 
evaluation), and/or stories of the consequences that accompany particular choices and actions 
(Narrative) (Wiggan, 2017: 644).  
 
Data selection 
Speeches to conferences/meetings and policy strategy documents are a particular Discourse 
Genre (Chiapello and Fairclough, 2002: 193; Fairclough, 2001a: 123). They are a style of 
communication that invites selection/omission of ‘evidence’ and elaboration of preferred ideas, 
interpretations and policies to convey narratives intended to convince the audience(s) of the 
desirability of the speakers/authors goals. The principle intended audience of the purposively 
selected texts are individuals and organisations operating in the fields of social welfare, public policy 
broadly and financial services. The texts constitute a form of what Schmidt (2011: 117) terms, a 
coordinative discourse (of and for policy actors) rather than a communicative discourse addressed to 
the public. Consequently, the data analysis helps to understand how the UK Government is 
(re)interpreting the social world to contextualise and articulate the turn to SIIM amongst policy 
oriented actors.  
The study is based on a purposively selected sample of Ministerial speeches and UK 
Government strategy documents produced between 2011 and 2016 (Table 1). Three policy texts 
were selected for analysis, on the grounds that each marked an explicit statement of UK government 
strategy on social investment. One, published in 2011 represents the expressed strategy of the 
Coalition Government and the second and third, published in 2016 set out the strategy of the 
Conservative Government. The selection of speeches includes a talk given by the Prime Minister 
during the UK presidency of the 2013 meeting of the G8, which the UK Government themed around 
impact investing. Also included because of the salience of their departments to the SIIM are 
speeches by the then Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, Iain Duncan Smith, and the then 
Minister for Civil Society, Rob Wilson - located in the Cabinet Office. The Department for Work and 
Pensions (DWP) is directly responsible for social security and employment programmes, and 
between 2010 and 2016 commissioned 14 Social Impact Bonds (SIB) making it the commissioner of 
the greatest number of SIB within government (DWP, 2016: 22-25). The Cabinet Office (CO) 
meanwhile has had a lead role in overseeing public service reform, developing and co-ordinating 
government SIIM strategy and introducing measures to help support and co-ordinate market 
development (see below). The material was stored in a Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis 
Software package, reviewed and initially coded according to the component elements of the 
contextualisation and deconstruction categories of the CPDAF. Informed by the social policy and 
politics literature on the Coalition and Conservative Governments, further coding was then 
undertaken to explore the occurrence of particular ideas, terminology and concepts to identify 
themes grounded in the text.  
 
Table 1: Texts analysed 
David Cameron,  
Prime Minister 
‘Social investment can be a great force for social change’. 6th June 2013. Social 
Impact Investment Forum, London 
 
Iain Duncan Smith, Secretary of 
State for Work and Pensions 
 
G8 Social Impact Investment Event. 6th June 2013. 
 
‘The role of government in social impact investing’. Social Impact Investment 
Taskforce, Rome. 29th October 2014 (published 4th November) 
 
‘The welfare state – continuing the revolution’. Conference of Reform Think Tank, 
London. 4th February 2015 
Rob Wilson,  
Minister for Civil Society 
 
‘The growth of social investment in the UK’. Social Investment Academy at Hogan 
Lovells, London. 2nd March 2016.  
 
‘Launch of Access ­ The Foundation for Social Investment’ 15th March 2015 
 
‘OECD Social Impact Investment report’. Cabinet Office. 3rd February 2015 
(published 6th February)  
 
‘Social Investment and Public Services Conference’ Kensington Town Hall, London. 
22nd January 2015. 
Cabinet Office 
 
Growing the Social Investment Market: a vision and strategy, February 2011. 
 
Social investment: a force for social change - UK strategy 2016, March. 
 
Social investment: UK as a global hub - international strategy 2016, March. 
 
 
The policy trajectory: community redevelopment to an impact investment market  
Financial exclusion, community finance and capacity building 
The foundations of the contemporary impact investment market in the UK were laid during 
the Labour administrations between 1997 and 2010. Under Labour, individual and community access 
to finance was identified as a cause of, and solution to, socio-economic exclusion and means to 
resource the diversification of public service providers (Mulgan, 2015: 55; Whitfield, 2015: 7-8; 
Westall, 2010). Westall (2010: 120-121) identifies three stages to Labour’s policy focus and 
concomitant development of policy levers. First, a concern with underprovision of mainstream 
finance in ‘’disadvantaged’ communities and the negative effect on entrepreneurial activity and 
scaling up commercial and social enterprises to support regeneration. This was accompanied by 
measures such as tax relief for community investment and support for community development 
financial institutions.   
Second, a focus on directing public resources in the form of grants and loans to strengthen 
the third sector. The Futurebuilders programme, established in 2004 and closed in 2010, for 
example, provided over £125million in loans during this period to third sector organisations (Wells, 
2013a: 160). The aim was to increase its impact in communities and improve its capacity to 
participate in public service quasi markets by encouraging greater use of loans rather than grants, 
adoption of more business-like practices and a concern with the social and economic value of 
activity (Westall, 2010: 120-122; Affleck and Mellor, 2006: 309-312).  
The third stage involved a growing interest in harnessing private capital to expand social 
investment funding and focus providers on achieving particular social outcomes. The passing of the 
Dormant Bank and Building Society Accounts Act 2008, for example, meant unclaimed funds in 
inactive private bank accounts could be used by the state for community development and social 
investment. To this end the Labour Government announced in 2009 its intention to establish a Social 
Investment Wholesale Bank, independent of government, to allocate a portion of unclaimed assets 
for community redevelopment or third sector capacity building, though it lost office before it could 
do so (Edmonds, 2015: 6-7).  
Prior to leaving office in 2010 Labour also oversaw the commissioning of the first Social 
Impact Bond (SIB) in the UK, targeted at reducing reoffending rates at HMP Peterborough (McHugh 
et al, 2013: 248; Mulgan, 2015: 61). Unlike a standard Payment by Results  (PbR) arrangement, the 
upfront funding to meet set up and running costs of a SIB intervention are drawn from private 
investors (for-profit or philanthropic) rather than the state or service provider. In exchange the 
investor(s) receive a financial rate of return from the commissioner determined by the nature of the 
problem/ population targeted and estimated future savings in public expenditure. However, should 
the intervention fail to achieve the target outcomes then investors receive no payment and lose 
their capital. By separating funding from service delivery the SIB is intended to enable private 
finance capital to profit from specific welfare interventions while redistributing risk of programme 
failure away from commissioned providers and the state, though whether the latter is realised in 
practice is contested (Whitfield, 2015; Sinclair et al, 2014).  
 
Creating an enabling environment for Social Impact Investment  
Under the Coalition Government a suite of reforms were initiated with the aim of creating 
an enabling environment to grow and embed the SIIM. These reforms included changes to 
legislation and policy relating to outcome based contracting; tax relief to stimulate investment; 
creation of new intermediary institutions and funds to build market capacity and provide 
information, advice and guidance. The Coalition Government’s 2011 ‘Open Public Services’ White 
paper, for example, signaled commitment to intensifying the use of non-state public service 
providers (Dowling and Harvie, 2014: 878), while commissioning across different policy areas shifted 
towards the use of contracts which paid providers on the basis of social outcomes achieved 
(Payment by Results) (Edmiston and Nicholls, 2017: 3). Market rationality has consequently been 
mainstreamed as the principle means of shaping the behavior of service providers and the means to 
hold them to account (NAO, 2015: 14-15; Painter, 2012: 7). The drive to achieve socially beneficial 
outcomes via markets was echoed in the Public Service (Social Value) Act 2012, which introduced a 
requirement for those procuring goods and services to consider social and environmental factors. 
This integration of ‘the social’ into procurement has been envisaged as a means to drive a 
reorganisation of services to reduce long term costs, bringing a new angle to the pursuit of ‘value for 
money’ (Cabinet Office, 2015a: 13; Dowling and Harvie, 2014: 879).  
Accompanying a broader expansion of PbR contracting in public services, the Coalition 
oversaw the rollout of the SIB commissioned under New Labour and introduced further SIB pilots 
targeting improvements in employability, health, homelessness and family services (Whitfield, 2015: 
31). To minimise transaction costs and improve the ability of potential SIB commissioners to price 
interventions, the Centre for Social Impact Bonds, which had been established in the Cabinet Office, 
has made cost-benefit data on the performance of previous policy interventions available (Unit Cost 
Database) along with model service agreement contracts (Centre for Social Impact Bonds, 2016; 
Edmiston and Nicholls, 2017: 6).  By the end of 2016 the overall number of SIB projects in the UK was 
thirty-three, which is a significant increase on the single SIB inherited by the Coalition in 2010. 
Estimates of the total number of SIB launched globally (eighty nine) up to 2017 give credence to the 
Coalition Government’s claims of UK global leadership in this field (Social Finance, 2017). 
To open up funding for social investment including for SIB from the charity sector, Section 15 
of the Charities (Protection and Social Investment) Act 2016 gave charities a general power to make 
social investments, provided this accords with making a financial return and furthering their charity’s 
purpose (Charities (Protection and Social Investment) Act 2016). To incentivise private investment 
meanwhile, the Coalition introduced the Social Investment Tax Relief (SITR), through the Finance Act 
2014. The SITR allows investors in recognised social economy organisations and/or UK Government 
accredited SIB to offset their investment against income tax and Capital Gains Tax liabilities (HM 
Revenue and Customs, 2014; Cabinet Office, 2015b). Triodos Bank, for example, subsequently 
announced how its use of SITR to offset a portion of individual’s investment against income tax 
raised the value of the potential rate of return in two SIB from 7% per annum to 19% (Triodos Bank, 
2015).  
The harnessing of private financial resources for building SIIM infrastructure was assisted by 
the creation in 2012 of Big Society Capital (BSC); the Coalition’s version of a Social Investment 
Wholesale Bank. £400 million of funds has been made available to BSC from dormant bank accounts, 
with a further £200 million drawn from investments by four UK banks (Big Society Capital, 2016; HM 
Government, 2016a: 8). The investment made by the banks in BSC can be traced to Project Merlin 
and the agreement the Government reached with the banks in 2011 following public disquiet about 
the activities of finance and its social utility. The agreement implied banks improving small business 
lending, giving due consideration to public feeling with regard to pay, and extending support to Big 
Society initiatives (HM Treasury, 2011). Through support for BSC the Coalition implanted 
involvement of financial actors in the emergent SIIM and provided a mechanism for banks to 
demonstrate their commitment to the public good and their potential to be socially useful actors 
(Edmonds, 2015: 4). 
A comprehensive comparison of social investment policy and discourse pre and post the 
2010 UK General Election is beyond the scope of this studyi, but the overview provided here 
suggests that we can discern (subtle) differences between Labour and Conservative led 
Governments that perhaps reflects a mixture of ideational tradition and policy sequencing. In short, 
Labour’s reforms developed in the context of the relative underdevelopment of social investment as 
a policy tool for social welfare. Labour’s initial interest in social investment reflected its potential for 
offering a state and market driven approach to tackling area based exclusion, rather than more 
thorough transformation of the welfare state. Labour’s approach largely retained the state as the 
principle funder, organiser and regulator of finance for social investment (Wells, 2013: 80; 2012: 
173) while paving the way for subsequent Conservative led Governments to pursue a more thorough 
re-configuration of the state as the enabler and guarantor of an increasingly financialised market in 
social investment that newly extends into areas of person focused welfare interventions (Wells, 
2013: 80; 2012: 173).  
 
Unpacking the problem representation: social breakdown and the cohesive society  
The reconfiguring of state intervention to foster markets in welfare and social investment as 
the best means for achieving economic growth and a better society is aligned with the leading 
Conservative politicians endorsement pre and post the 2010 General Election for constructing a ‘Big 
Society’. Represented as the alternative to Labour’s supposed commitment to ‘Big Government’, this 
posed a critique of the hierarchical system of state target setting and performance management in 
the public sector as squeezing out local knowledge and initiative which led to unresponsive, 
wasteful, ineffectual services (Painter, 2012: 4; Ellison, 2011: 53). Long standing conservative 
depictions of state activity and public expenditure discouraging independence and 
entrepreneurialism, because people look to the state rather than themselves and their communities 
(Wiggan, 2011; Slater, 2014: 954), were marshalled to argue the welfare state was responsible for 
the fraying of social bonds, and, in the words of David Cameron, ‘a Broken Society’ (Jones, 2009: 
365; Williams, 2012).  
Conversely the Big Society is premised on substituting direct public provision for mutualist, 
charitable and market forms of support, complementary to individual initiative, business enterprise 
and social cohesion through curtailment and/or decentralisation of the welfare state (Wiggan, 2011; 
Sage, 2012: 371; Williams, 2012: 121). As Corbett and Walker (2013) and Bonefeld (2015: 424) point 
out however, at the core of the Big Society is not a rejection of market liberalism, nor a disavowal of 
state activity. Rather the Big Society is premised upon, and seeks a repurposing of, state authority 
and resources to reconfigure the management, accountability and delivery of public welfare to 
privilege market rationality and better accord with the expansion and protection of a competitive 
market order. It is a distinctly political project that paradoxically rests on the subsuming of political 
division and disruption that arise from antagonistic social relations associated with competitive 
markets (Bonefeld, 2015: 421).  
Political actors have to work to make their particular problem interpretations pre-eminent, 
and secure support for their preferred policies and visions. It is not surprising then that threaded 
throughout UK Government strategy documents and speeches is a boosterist account of the 
potentiality of SIIM that is rooted in a ‘Broken Britain-Big Society’ problem definition-policy solution 
narrative. In analysing this we draw out how the interweaving of Accountability Warrants 
(identification of social problems as rooted in social breakdown) and Political Warrants (appeal to an 
abstraction of social cohesion as the social good) contextualise and assemble the case for the SIIM 
turn, justify the state intervention necessary to make SIIM a feasible, sustainable reality and work to 
booster SIIM as innovative policy.  
The text - Growing the Social Investment Market: A vision and Strategy quickly embeds a 
Broken Britain-Big Society dynamic. The Ministerial foreword opens with; ‘We want a bigger, 
stronger society’ (HM Government, 2011: 5) and this is followed in chapter one with, ‘Britain needs 
new ways of tackling some very stubborn and expensive problems such as fractured communities, 
homelessness and high rates of re-offending’ (HM Government, 2011). This Broken Britain-Big 
Society theme is repeated across texts as the speech by the Minister for Civil Society illustrates.  
 
“Experience has taught us time and again that government does not have all the answers to 
the trickiest issues in our communities. Look at homelessness. Reoffending. Long term 
unemployment. These complex problems aren’t new but their solutions have eluded 
successive governments for decades…we know that charities and social enterprises often 
have the local and specialist knowledge to be able to tailor services around the needs of 
communities and individuals...” (Minister for Civil Society Rob Wilson MP, speech to the 
launch of Access - The Foundation for Social Investment 15th March 2015).  
 
Here we have an inscribed evaluation of a negative present (‘experience has taught us […] 
government does not have all the answers’) counter posed to the potential of non-state actors 
(‘specialist knowledge’). The negative judgment of state intervention, the link to social problems and 
positive endorsement of non-state actors craft a conservative interpretation of what the problem is 
and proffer a liberal market solution (opening up public services and social investment) justified by 
the implied consequences of no policy change (an Accountability Warrant).  The conclusion to the 
Prime Minister’s speech to the 2013 meeting of the G8 also shows how the case for SIIM as 
necessary and desirable is conveyed.  
 
“…Let me finish by saying this. Some people have asked whether I still believe in building a 
bigger, stronger society? I say to them - look around this room. See how social investment 
can help to change lives. See how social investment is bringing communities together. See 
how social investment is making our societies and therefore our countries stronger. Am I 
prepared to fight for that? You bet I am. Social investment can be a great force for social 
change on the planet. It can help us to build bigger and stronger societies. That power is in 
our hands. And together we will use it to build a better future for ourselves, for our children 
and for generations to come” (Prime Minister, David Cameron MP, 2013 speech to the 
Meeting of the G8, London).  
 
The Prime Minister’s rhetorical question regarding his support for the Big Society sets up his 
subsequent use of combative language (‘am I prepared to fight for that? You bet I am’) enabling 
reaffirmation of passionate commitment to the Big Society concept and enlisting a new weapon in 
this fight - social investment. Judgements as to the power of social investment to create a stronger 
society can then be presented (Inscribed evaluation), which imply that collective future well-being 
legitimates (Rational legitimation) social investment reform. The Prime Minister’s personal 
ownership of the social impact investment turn also confers social investment with legitimation by 
authority (authorisation). At the same time the identification of SII with the person of the Prime 
Minister is tempered in the text by use of the words, ‘together’, ‘us’, ‘our’ and ‘we’. Such a technique 
depoliticizes social impact investment as a partisan project and obfuscates who exactly ‘we’ refers to 
(Wodak et al, 2009: 45), dissolving the social divisions of society to conjure up a unity that elides 
questions as to whose interests are served, or not, through the SIIM. 
 
The recuperation of finance capital and recontextualisation of social investment 
While the concluding paragraph of the Prime Ministers speech to the G8 provides a robust 
endorsement of social investment as the means to bring about the Big Society, the opening 
paragraph provides a narrative legitimation, in the form of the Broken Britain problem 
representation, for the recuperation of finance capital as a socially useful actor.  Given that 
financialisation has been associated with growing inequality and socio-economic destabilisation 
(Breger Bush, 2016: 132) this is seemingly a bold move. Yet, subsuming finance within a SIIM 
discourse of societal improvement (‘a great idea that can transform societies… tackle the most 
difficult problems’) and economic opportunities (‘potential is that big’… ‘sell it to the world’) 
diminishes the disruptive threat of financialisation, while boostering the claim that social impact 
investment is innovative and effective. Constructing the SIIM to repurpose and channel the avowed 
power of finance to transform society and advance the common good is therefore situated as 
legitimate as a rational course of action. 
 
“We’ve got a great idea here that can transform our societies, by using the power of finance 
to tackle the most difficult social problems. Problems that have frustrated government after 
government, country after country, generation after generation. Issues like drug abuse, 
youth unemployment, homelessness and even global poverty. The potential for social 
investment is that big. So I want to make it a success in Britain and I want to sell it all over 
the world… “(Prime Minister, David Cameron MP, 2013 speech to the Meeting of the G8). 
 
Similarly speeches given by the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions offer boosterist 
depictions of finance led social policy by evoking finance as a dynamic, force for change, which 
harnessed via SIIM can redress the problems of a fragmented society.  
 
“… Cut adrift from the labour market, all too often, those at the bottom of society come to 
feel they have no productive role to play. Meanwhile, at the top, we find some of our most 
successful and well rewarded professionals productively involved in wealth creation. The 
result is we are left with a society increasingly torn, as the gap between the top and bottom 
grows ever wider. The question for all of us in the G8 is how we go about bringing these two 
ends back together – building a more cohesive society, and benefiting our economy at the 
same time. I believe the answer lies in social investment…” (Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions, Iain Duncan-Smith, 2013 meeting of the G8) 
 
“…Just imagine a social enterprise working in a particular deprived neighbourhood-be it in 
London, Los Angeles, Milan or Moscow. Investors buy into it and as with any investment, will 
want to see it flourish. Because they are risking their money – money that could otherwise 
be reaping a return elsewhere – those investors will want to see that social programme 
succeed, bringing a whole new rigour to how it is delivered. But what’s more the same 
investors will want to take an interest in that community where they would 
otherwise be totally detached…brought back into contact with our most disadvantaged 
individuals and families, for mutual benefit. In doing so, these wealth creators could have a 
powerful influence on the communities themselves... a human interface between two 
polarised worlds... bringing success to the doorstep of failure, and two ends of our society 
closer together – bringing the city to the inner city, and Wall Street to poorer streets.  
This, surely, is worth investing in: the prospect of sound public finances… at the same time, a 
stronger and more cohesive society” (‘The role of government in social impact 
Investing’, Iain Duncan Smith MP, Secretary of State for Work and Pensions London, October 
29th, 2014). 
 
The texts provide vivid depictions of social divisions (‘bringing the city to the inner city’) but 
these are positioned (Evoked evaluation) as rooted in exclusion (‘cut adrift from’) from direct 
economic production for those implied to be  ‘workless’ and the (self) exclusion from society of 
those floating away at the top, implied to be the (sole) creators of wealth. The drawing together of 
Political (‘cohesive society’) and Accountability (‘benefiting the economy’; ‘changing lives’) Warrants 
with Rational modes of legitimation (‘sound public finances’) provides acknowledgement of 
persistent inequalities, but dissolves any relationship between inequality and the organisation of 
economy and social reproduction in a stratified society. What we have therefore is the construction 
of depoliticised social problems whose resolution requires no sacrifice from those at the top. Indeed 
the very endowments of income, wealth and power become the means to achieve social unity in a 
One Nation, Big (liberal market) Society and consequently this justifies SIIM reform as the 
mechanism to unlock power and wealth. 
The positive depiction of the power of finance when channelled through SIIM is a recurring 
theme in the boostering of SIIM threaded through the Coalition and Conservative Government’s 
texts. The document ‘Social investment: a force for social change-2016 strategy’, for example, 
constructs SIIM as a new policy lever of untapped potentiality. 
 
“…A vibrant social investment market will support the growth of new businesses, drive the 
transformation of our public services and help us to build stronger, more cohesive 
communities… Social investment can accelerate the growth of new businesses, transforming 
the impact of our public services, and support stronger communities to tackle the social 
challenges that they face. It has the power to transform lives and I am more committed than 
ever to helping social investment achieve its potential” (Minister for Civil Society, Rob 
Wilson MP, HM Government, 2016: 5).   
 
The terms - ‘vibrant’, ‘growth’, ‘drive’ - generate a sense of anticipation, movement and 
momentum in the text, while change of state verbs such as ‘transformation’, ‘transforming’ and 
‘transform’ imbue (Evoked evaluation) SIIM with a spirit of dynamism which, when unleashed will 
revolutionise social policy. The popularisation of the social investment concept from the mid-1990s 
by social democrats arguably marked an appropriation of business-friendly language to provide a 
new way to (re) legitimate publicly resourced, organised and provided services (Jenson, 2010).  The 
discourse of Conservative UK Government Ministers inverts this, re-contextualising (Fairclough, 
2001: 133) state support for human capital investment in a way that co-opts the social to gloss the 
further commodification of public provision and embedding of market rationality (Dowling, 2017; 
Keohane et al, 2013). Discussion of social investment is now situated in and saturated by financial 
terminology such as ‘value’, ‘returns’,  ‘investment ready’, ‘assets’, ‘portfolios’ and ‘ISAs’ (HM 
Government, 2011 7-8). The UK Government’s notion of social investment is then (re)contextualised 
as a firmly hybridised market concept, premised upon harnessing private finance to unleash a diffuse 
network of providers to creatively secure outcomes that equate to better societies. This is evocative 
of what Jenson (2017: 32) identifies as a broader move in European policymaking towards a new 
social paradigm that fuses social entrepreneurialism and social investment. These two concepts are 
situated as a new (third?) way to foster innovation and enterprise to reconfigure social policy to 
avoid problems ostensibly associated with public welfare bureaucracy or direct privatisation. This 
implies the postulated new social paradigm is, in a sense then, post neo-liberal and post state 
welfarist.  
The analysis here indicates though that while social impact investment might be included 
within this new paradigm, and indeed differs from public welfare, it is not a shift from liberal market 
precepts, but an intensification of them, involving the financialisation of the social (see Dowling and 
Harvie, 2014; Dowling, 2017). This is perhaps not surprising as, for liberal conservatives, problems 
that we might regard as arising from the operation of markets; the financial crisis, austerity and 
inequality, can be solved by new market solutions (Mirowski, 2014: 64). Support by the Coalition and 
subsequent Conservative Government for extensive state activity as SIIM builder, regulator and 
participant (HM Government, 2016a: 19) might appear inconsistent, but reflect a longstanding 
conservative-liberal recognition that the role of the state is to establish, maintain and defend a 
market order if competitiveness is to become the organising rationale for all social and economic life 
(Amable, 2011: 10; Hayek, 1948: 111; Mirowski, 2014: 53). As the texts make clear, the Coalition 
acknowledged that left to emerge spontaneously, the SIIM would be stymied by conflicts of interest, 
information asymmetries, inadequate infrastructure and lack of participants. The state must 
therefore construct and guide the market (HM Government, 2011: 27; HM Government, 2011: 5). 
The text; Social Investment: the UK as a global hub’: International Strategy, acknowledges this by 
drawing attention to how “…the UK benefits from unprecedented direct government intervention to 
ensure that the market continues to strengthen and grow…” (HM Government, 2016b: 5) implying 
this is a necessary, positive draw for investors (evoked evaluation).   
As Descheneau and Paterson (2011: 665) observe in relation to the construction of carbon 
markets, governments are not only in the business of building market infrastructure. They are also 
deeply involved in the generation and mobilising of ‘desire’ amongst potential market actors. The 
2011 and 2016 strategy papers, for example, draw attention to the (anticipated) market value of 
social investment and associated scale of social enterprise in the UK and globally (HM Government, 
2011: 17; HM Government, 2016b: 5). Not only does this communicate the promising opportunities 
for capital accumulation, the citation of ‘hard data’ from independent sources provides quantitative 
evidence (Evidentiary warrant) which legitimates (Rational legitimation) SIIM development and its 
boostering to possible market participants. 
 
“The global social investment market continues to grow. Based on the annual Global Impact 
Investing Network (GIIN) survey of impact investors, there was approximately £30 billion of 
impact investments managed globally in 2014. This has risen to over £40 billion in 2015. This 
is still a small proportion of the projected £66 trillion of total assets that will be under 
management by 2020, but demonstrates substantial growth in an emerging field” (HM 
Government, 2016a: 15)  
 Conclusion 
Applying Hyatt’s (2013) Critical Policy Discourse Analysis Framework this article provides a 
transparent, systematic analysis of UK Government impact investing discourse, identifying its 
underlying justifications and the mechanisms by which it has boostered the SIIM imaginary as the 
necessary, desirable welfare future. As Gutsche (2015: 502) notes, while ‘policy boosterism’ is 
concerned with positive representations to sell programmes and policies it is more than marketing 
froth. It typically carries within it the presumptions and preferences of a broader political-economic 
project (McCann, 2013: 8). The analysis of the texts undertake here show how multiple rationales 
and legitimations draw on and reproduce a distinct Conservative Broken Britain-Big Society narrative 
that is discursively and materially linked into advancement of a broader liberal-market project to 
extend a competitive market order (Amable, 2012; Bonefeld, 2015) into new areas of welfare service 
provision. Accountability warrants (something should be done to halt poor social outcomes and 
social fragmentation); Political warrants (a cohesive stronger society) and Evidentiary warrants 
(allusions to economic value) are woven together to provide a problem diagnosis of ‘social 
breakdown’ and state intervention and the logical policy response (Rational legitimation) of 
(financialised) market mechanisms and non-state actors. Consequently, how antagonistic social 
relations originating in societal stratification and the distribution of power and resources might 
contribute to the emergence of social problems is necessarily omitted. Successive UK Governments 
have therefore been able to construe support for SIIM as ‘in the national interest’ (HM Government, 
2011: 7) by postulating that problem resolution and social cohesion will be realised from 
mobilisation (via SIIM) of untapped private capital. The discourse elides how the very accumulation 
of such resources is implicated in the social divisions and inequality SIIM is pitched to resolve, which 
enables Ministers to recuperate financial organisations and financialised markets as socially useful 
mechanisms for the attainment of social stability. 
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